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Abstract— Wireless sensor networks are promising solutions
for many applications. However, wireless sensor nodes suffer
from many constraints such as low computation capability, small
memory, limited energy resources, and so on. Grouping is an
important technique to localize computation and reduce communication overhead in wireless sensor networks. In this paper,
we use grouping to refer to the process of combining a set of
sensor nodes with similar properties. We propose two centralized
group rekeying (CGK) schemes for secure group communication
in sensor networks. The lifetime of a group is divided into
three phases, i.e., group formation, group maintenance, and
group dissolution. We demonstrate how to set up the group and
establish the group key in each phase. Our analysis shows that the
proposed two schemes are computationally efficient and secure.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are used in many applications in military, environmental and health related areas.
However, nodes in a WSN suffer from many constraints such
as low computation capability, small memory, limited energy
resources, and so on. Grouping is an important technique to
localize computation and reduce communication overhead in
WSNs.
The most common method of grouping is clustering. The
essential operation in sensor node clustering is to select a
set of cluster heads among the sensors in the network, and
cluster the rest of the nodes with these heads [1]. Cluster
heads are responsible for coordination among the nodes within
their clusters, and communication with each other and/or with
external observers on behalf of their clusters. Many routing
protocols and key management protocols have been proposed
using the clustering technique [2], [3].
However, grouping goes far beyond clustering. In this paper,
we use grouping to refer to the process of combining a set
of sensors with similar properties. The essential operation
in sensor node grouping is to dynamically combine a set
of sensors based on the observed events. The result of the
grouping is a group. Unlike clustering focusing on the whole
sensor network, grouping is only involved with sensors in
a small region. Without additional clarifications, the term
grouping in this paper refers to the local combination of
a set of sensor nodes. There are many similarities between
clustering and grouping, for example:
•

Sensors in a cluster or a group are usually geographically
close to each other.

Both clustering and grouping are used to localize computation and reduce communication overhead.
• A cluster usually has a cluster head and a group may
have a group controller.
However, important differences exist between clustering and
grouping. The main differences are listed below:
• Clustering is a global concept while grouping usually
focuses on a small region. When clustering is used in
a sensor network, the whole sensor network is divided
into clusters. However, grouping usually involves with
a relatively small number of sensors. These sensors are
combined together based on the defined properties.
• Clustering and grouping could be adopted separately or
together. They do not depend on each other. Grouping
can be carried out with clustering or without.
• When clustering and grouping are both used to organize
a sensor network, a group could be a part of a cluster, or
even the union of several clusters.
• Clusters are decided by the partition algorithm adopted
in the sensor networks. There is no relation between
the clusters and the observed events. However, groups
are usually activated by events. A group is set up and
dissolved on the fly.
Security is an important research area in sensor networks
[4]. In this paper, we focus on secure group communication
(SGC) [5]. Secure group communication in sensor networks
refers to a scenario in which sensors in a group can send
and receive messages to/from group members in a way that
outsiders are unable to glean any information even when they
are able to intercept the messages. Secure group communication depends on the group key to protect the messages.
The security requirements of group communication include
authentication, confidentiality, integration, freshness etc. [5].
In addition, secure group communication also requires forward
secrecy and backward secrecy [5]. The obvious benefit of
secure group communication to WSNs is that outside nodes
are unable to obtain any messages transmitted to the group.
Recent research has also revealed that the group key can be
used for filtering out false data injected in the sensor networks
[6], [7].
Although a few papers [8], [9] discussed secure group communication in sensor networks in the literature, the problem
has not been well-studied. Previous works on secure group
communication either consider the whole sensor network as
•
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a group or define the immediate neighboring nodes around a
sensor as a group. However, grouping is more general than
these two cases.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows: We formally
define the grouping and secure group communication problem
in WSNs. We differentiate between the concepts of clustering
and grouping. We propose two centralized group rekeying
schemes for secure group communication in WSNs and further
evaluate their performances in various group settings.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses
the related work. Section III introduces grouping and its
properties. Section IV presents our proposed centralized group
rekeying schemes, followed by the security and performance
analysis in Section V, the simulation and results in Section
VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. R ELATED WORK
The secure group communication problem has been extensively studied in the context of secure multicast in wired
or wireless networks. Many centralized solutions and a few
distributed solutions have been proposed. However, most of
them are not suitable for WSNs. For example, the centralized
schemes proposed in [10], [11] assume a key tree is maintained
in the central controller. However, none of them considers
the management overhead of such a key tree structure in the
central controller, which is important in sensor networks due to
the constraints on the sensor nodes. The distributed schemes,
such as [12], [13], require excessive computation (exponential
operations) to generate and update the group key, which are
also unbearable in WSNs.
A few papers [8], [9], [14], [15] address the secure group
communication problem in the context of sensor networks. The
authors in [8] proposed a scheme using a key tree to manage
group members as they join or leave the group. However,
the authors did not provide the details of the group rekeying
process. In [9], the authors proposed an energy-efficient levelbased hierarchical system for sensor networks which also
includes a group key management scheme. The proposed
group rekeying scheme requires many exponential operations
which makes it possibly not practical in sensor networks.
In [14], the authors proposed a centralized group rekeying
scheme based on logical key tree hierarchy for WSNs. In all
these three works [8], [9], [14], the base station is regarded
as the central controller and the whole sensor network is
considered as a group. In [15], the authors proposed a group
rekeying scheme for filtering false data in sensor networks.
The group is defined as the immediate neighboring nodes
around a sensor in the scheme. However, the authors did not
address the group rekeying problem when the group includes
sensor nodes separated by multiple hops.
In the following sections we present our proposed centralized group rekeying schemes. We use the following notation
for the remainder of this paper:
•
•

A, B are principals such as communicating nodes.
IDA denotes the sensor identifier of node A.

•
•
•
•
•
•

e(A, T ) is a set of events observed by sensor A in time
period T .
KAB denotes the secret pairwise key shared between A
and B.
MK is the encryption of message M with key K.
M AC(K, M ) denotes the computation of the message
authentication code of message M with key K.
A −→ B denotes A unicasts a message to B.
A −→ ∗ denotes A broadcasts a message to its neighbors.
III. G ROUPING AND ITS PROPERTIES

As we discussed before, grouping refers to the process of
combining a set of sensors with similar properties. These
properties usually refer to the events observed by the sensors.
A group can be defined by many aspects. For example, all
photo sensors activated in the last one minute form a group;
the temperature sensors with temperature more than 100◦ C
form a group. Without loss of generality, we define a group
G as a set of sensors A in region R which observe an event
E in a period of time T:
G = {A|E ∈ e(A, T ) and A in R}

(1)

The lifetime of a group can be divided into three phases, i.e.,
group formation, group maintenance, and group dissolution.
In the group formation phase, the sensor nodes which
satisfy the defined criteria form a group. The process of group
formation is usually triggered by a special node, which is
called a group controller. The group controller can be decided
by the controller selection process. A simple way to decide a
group controller is as follows: when an event E occurs in the
field, the sensor detecting this event and having the strongest
signal stands out as the group controller. The group formation
phase is ended with all the group members receiving the group
key. Then, the group maintenance phase begins.
The group maintenance phase is divided into sessions. The
duration of sessions can be fixed or dynamic depending on the
applications. The group controller is responsible for distributing the group key to the sensor nodes at each session. When
new sensors join a group or existing members leave the group,
the group membership must be updated. In addition, when
a compromised group member is detected, the compromised
group member must also be removed from the group. Since the
group key is updated during each session, the leaving members
and the compromised members will not obtain the new group
key during the next session.
In the group dissolution phase, the sensor nodes in the group
are not bound together anymore. The key materials set up
before should be released.
IV. G ROUP REKEYING SCHEMES FOR SGC IN WSN S
In this section, we present two centralized group rekeying
(CGK) schemes for secure group communication in WSNs.
We assume that there is a secure channel between the sensor
node and the base station. By a secure channel, we mean
a channel that offers confidentiality, data authentication, integrity, and freshness. The key materials to build the secure
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channel can be set up by the key management protocols
described in [3], [16].
A. Scheme 1
Scheme 1 is based on Blundo’s theory [17]. The group key
is distributed to the group members through unicasting. The
group formation phase in Scheme 1 is described below.
1) Setup: Before sensor nodes are distributed, the setup
server randomly 
generates a bivariate t-degree polynot
i j
mial f (x, y) =
i,j=0 aij x y over a finite field Fq
where q is a prime number that is large enough to
accommodate a cryptographic key such that it has the
property that f (x, y) = f (y, x). For each sensor i, the
setup server computes a polynomial share of f (x, y),
that is, f (i, y), and loads the single-variate polynomial
f (i, y) to the sensor i. For any two sensor nodes i
and j, node i can compute the common key f (i, j) by
evaluating f (i, y) at point j, and node j can compute
the same key f (j, i) = f (i, j) by evaluating f (j, y) at
point i.
2) Broadcast interest: Once the group controller is identified, it first obtains a group identifier gid from the base
station and then generates a random key Kg as the group
key. Subsequently, the group controller broadcasts a
message requesting expression of interest in a particular
event E to its neighboring nodes which are reachable in
at most L hops (global broadcasting is not necessary):

2n unicasts and one local broadcast. To update the group key,
it requires n unicasts of messages.
Note that Scheme 1 requires n unicasts of messages to
update the group key which may cause heavy traffic in the
area when the group size is large. We propose Scheme 2
which uses local broadcast to replace the unicasts to reduces
the communication overhead when updating the group key.
B. Scheme 2
Scheme 2 is based on Blundo’s theory [17] and the personal
key share distribution scheme [18]. The group key in Scheme
2 is distributed through broadcasting. The group formation
phase in Scheme 2 is described below. The setup, broadcast
interest and join steps (1, 2, and 3) are the same as in Scheme
1 and are omitted.
4) Secret share distribution: The group controller randomly
picks a 2t-degree masking polynomial, h(x) = h0 +
h1 x+· · ·+h2t x2t , over Fq . Each group member Ai gets
the personal secret, Si = h(i), from the group controller
via the secure communication channel between them:
I −→ Ai : {Si }KAI
5) Distinct share broadcast: Given a set of IDs of revoked
group members, R = {r1 , r2 , · · · , rw }, w ≤ t, the
group controller randomly picks a t-degree polynomial
p(x) and constructs q(x) = Kg − p(x). Then, the
group controller distributes the shares of the t-degree
polynomials p(x) and q(x) to non-revoked sensors using
the following broadcast message:

I −→ ∗ : IDI |gid|E
3) Join: All the receivers observing the same event E send
a join request to the group controller I:

B

A −→ I : IDA |gid|E, M AC(KAI , IDA |gid|E)

= {R}
∪ {P (x) = g(x)p(x) + h(x)}
∪

where KAI is the pairwise key shared by the group
controller I with the sensor A. During the period when
interest and join messages are transmitted in the network, route tables are set up in the en-route nodes and
the group controller.
4) Group key distribution: Once the group controller authenticates the join request, the group controller unicasts
the group key Kg encrypted by the pairwise key to the
sensor A:
I −→ A : {Kg }KAI
In the group key maintenance phase, the group controller
keeps track of the join and leave requests in the group and
repeats step 4 to update the group key during each session.
The group controller maintains a table to keep the latest
membership. Without receiving the group key update messages
in a period of time τs , the key materials become obsolete and
the group members can start the group dissolution process.
Let |G| = n. Scheme 1 requires one local broadcast in the
group formation phase. The group controller may receive n
join requests and needs to send the group key to n members.
Thus, to set up the group key among n members, it requires

{Q(x) = g(x)q(x) + h(x)}

where the revocation polynomial g(x) is constructed as
g(x) = (x − r1 )(x − r2 ) · · · (x − rw ).
6) Group key recovery: If any non-revoked sensor node
Ai receives such a broadcast message, it evaluates the
polynomial P (x) and Q(x) at point i and gets P (i) =
g(i)p(i) + h(i) and Q(i) = g(i)q(i) + h(i). Because
Ai knows h(i) and g(i) = 0, it can compute p(i) =
P (i)−h(i)
and q(i) = Q(i)−h(i)
. Ai can finally compute
g(i)
gj (i)
the new group key Kg = p(i) + q(i). The revoked
sensors cannot recover the group key because g(x) = 0.
In the group maintenance phase, the group controller repeats steps 5 and 6 to distribute the group key during each
session. Similar to Scheme 1, Scheme 2 requires 2n unicasts
and one local broadcast to set up the group key among n
members. However, to update the group key, it only requires
one broadcast of messages.
C. Broadcast authentication
A missing link in both of the above schemes is how a group
controller broadcasts local authenticated messages (messages
requesting expression of interest in a particular event). In the
absence of authentication of broadcast messages, an adversary
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can impersonate a group controller and start a group. The
scheme in [19] can be adopted for broadcasting authenticated
messages.
The authors in [19] proposed a practical broadcast authentication scheme which supports multi-senders in a WSN. The
scheme can be used here to enable a sensor to broadcast local
authenticated messages. Unlike the key materials for broadcasting authentication messages required to be loaded on the
senders in the pre-distribution stage in [19], we require those
key materials to be sent to the group controller dynamically in
the group setup stage. When a group controller is identified in
the group formation phase, the group controller needs to send
a request to the base station to obtain a group identifier. At
that time, the base station can also load the required materials
for authenticating broadcast messages on the group controller
using a secure channel. Thus, the group controller can use the
obtained key materials to broadcast authenticated messages.
The adversaries cannot impersonate the group controller because they cannot authenticate themselves to the base station.
(For more detailed information about the practical broadcast
authentication scheme, please refer to [19].)
Note that our group rekeying schemes use an adapted
broadcast authentication scheme from [19]. Thus, the sensor
network should be loosely time synchronized to meet the
requirements in [19].
V. S ECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In Section IV, we noted that the group controller has to be
authenticated by the base station to get proper materials to
broadcast authenticated messages. Thus, an adversary cannot
impersonate a group controller to start the group formation
process.
Further, according to the scheme in [19], the group controller is only granted the ability to broadcast messages in
some specific time intervals. After these assigned intervals,
the group controller cannot broadcast messages to the sensor
network anymore. Therefore, even if the group controller is
compromised, the adversaries cannot utilize the group controller to indefinitely broadcast messages to the whole sensor
network.
In the group formation process, the group controller also
authenticates the joining members to ensure that only the
qualified sensors can join the group.
In case a sensor is compromised, the adversary can know
the group keys which it possesses but cannot obtain the group
keys not available to the sensor. Once the compromised sensor
is detected by some intrusion detection techniques such as
[20], [21], the compromised sensor could be removed from
the group.
The pairwise key shared by the group controller with each
joining member is built using Blundo’s theory [17]. To set up
the pairwise key, the sensor node needs to evaluate the polynomial value at point (i, j). Thus, the additional computation
overhead for calculating the pairwise key is almost negligible.
To use Blundo’s theory, each sensor node i needs to store
a t-degree polynomial f (i, x), which occupies (t + 1) log q

storage space. In addition, the group controller also needs
n storage units for the pairwise keys shared with the group
members and one unit for the group key. To use the scheme
in [19], the sensor nodes need to be loaded with some predistributed values. The storage requirements for broadcasting
authenticated messages are the same as the scheme in [19].
The two proposed schemes are compared in Table I.
TABLE I
C OMPARISON BETWEEN S CHEME 1 AND S CHEME 2.

message
Broadcast requiring msg
Join request
Secret share distribution
Group key distribution
Group key update
Group key revocation

Scheme 1
nums
size
1
O(log q)
n
O(log q)
n/a
n/a
n
O(log q)
n
O(log q)
n
O(log q)

Scheme 2
nums
size
1
O(log q)
n
O(log q)
n
O(log q)
1
O(t log q)
1
O(t log q)
1
O(t log q)

VI. S IMULATION AND RESULTS
The performance of the two proposed schemes was evaluated in SENSIM [22], a component-based discrete-event
simulator for sensor networks. Each sensor node in SENSIM consists of six components, i.e., app, net, mac, phy,
event generator, and battery. The two proposed schemes are
implemented in the network component independently. In
the simulation, all the packets sent to the MAC layer are
guaranteed to be received at the receivers. Thus, no packet
collisions are considered and the performance evaluated in the
simulation is under ideal conditions.
We consider both Scheme 1 and Scheme 2 operating on a
finite field Fq , where q is a 56-bit integer. The polynomial
degree t in Blundo’s theory is set to t = 4 which gives the
message size of Scheme 1 as 8 bytes and the max message size
of Scheme 2 as 136 bytes. We use the simulator parameters
that represent the Mica2 Mote radio characteristics. These
parameters are shown in Table II.
TABLE II
C HARACTERISTIC DATA FOR THE M ICA 2 SENSOR PLATFORM .
Field
Effective data rate
Transmit power
Receive power
Idle power
Sleep
Transition power
Transition time

Value
19.2kbps
36mW
14.4mW
14.4mW
0.015mW
28.8mW
800µs

We assume that 1000 nodes are uniformly dispersed in a
field with dimension 2000m × 2000m and we set the group
controller at (1088, 1151). The evaluation metrics include the
group formation time, the group key update time, the energy
consumption in group controller, and the energy consumption
in group member nodes. The group formation time is the time
duration from the group controller broadcasting the interest
message till all the group members receive the first group
key. We test the two schemes for different group sizes. The
group size is decided by a maximum count (max hops) along

3422

This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the ICC 2007 proceedings.

the routes in which the interest message is forwarded and we
assume that all sensor nodes which hear the message become
group members. For each group size, we run the simulation
ten times and the average value is measured. Table III shows
the group size and the max hops in our simulation.
TABLE III
G ROUP SIZE AND THE MAX HOPS IN THE SIMULATION .
L (max hops)
Group size

1
16

2
38

3
70

4
126

5
206

6
284

7
389

8
503

Fig. 3. Average group controller energy consumption: group formation phase.
Scheme 1 requires less energy to set up the group.

Figure 1 shows the group formation time as the number
of max hops increases. It shows that Scheme 2 requires more
time to set up the group because additional transmission of key
materials is required. Further, when the number of max hops
is greater than three, it takes a long time (> 1 min) for these
two schemes to set up the group. It indicates that the number
of max hops on routes which the interest messages are allowed
to traverse should be less than four. Figure 2 shows the group
key update time in the group maintenance phase. Scheme 2
is far better than Scheme 1 due to the use of broadcasting to
replace unicasting when updating the group key.

Fig. 1. Group formation time: Scheme 2 requires more time to set up the
group because of additional transmission of key materials is required.

Fig. 2. Group key update time: Scheme 2 is far better than Scheme 1 in the
stage of group maintenance.

Figures 3 and 4 show the average group controller energy
consumption in the group formation and group key update
phrases. As the figures indicate, although Scheme 1 requires
less energy for the group controller to set up the group, the
group controller in Scheme 1 consumes much more energy
to update the group key. Because the group key is updated
at regular time intervals, Scheme 1 may cause the group
controller to deplete its energy much faster than Scheme 2.
Figures 5 and 6 show the average group member energy
consumption in the group formation and group key update

Fig. 4. Average group controller energy consumption: group key update
phase. Scheme 2 is far better than Scheme 1 when updating the group key.

phases. As the figures show, Scheme 1 is slightly better than
Scheme 2 in the group formation phase but Scheme 2 is
far better than Scheme 1 in the group key update phase.
In consideration of the group key is updated at regular time
intervals, Scheme 2 is much better than Scheme 1 in the energy
consumption in group member sensor nodes.
Figures 7 and 8 show the energy distribution among group
members when the number of max hops is three. As the
figures show, Scheme 1 may cause the energy to be distributed
unevenly in the group formation phase. However, the energy
is distributed more evenly in Scheme 2 in both the group
formation and group update phases.
To summarize, with respect to the group formation time and
the energy consumption in the group controller and the group
member sensor nodes, Scheme 1 is slightly better than Scheme
2 in the group formation phase; however, Scheme 2 is far
better than Scheme 1 in the group key update phase. Because
the group key is updated at regular time intervals, Scheme 2
is better than Scheme 1 for secure group communication in
the sensor networks.
VII. C ONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed two centralized group rekeying
(CGK) schemes for secure group communication in WSNs.
Our analysis shows that both the schemes are efficient in
computation and secure in the sense of group communication.
Simulation results also show that Scheme 2 is a better option
than Scheme 1 to be a group rekeying scheme for secure group
communication in WSNs.
As the simulation shows, Scheme 2 is scalable to large
groups in the group maintenance phase. However, the group
formation phase may take a long time (> 2 mins) when the
number of max hops is great than four. The group formation
phase needs to be improved.
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Fig. 5. Average group member energy consumption: group formation phase.
The group members in Scheme 1 require less energy to set up the group.

Fig. 6. Average group member energy consumption: group key update phase.
Scheme 2 is far better than Scheme 1 when updating the group keys.
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